Summary
The most significant events of 2009 were the election of the new Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church and his visit to Belarus and President Lukashenko’s meeting with the Pope in the Vatican. Compared to the previous year, after the new Patriarch had been elected, the relations between the Belarusian regime and Belarusian Orthodox Church (the BOC) are cooling; the distance between the BOC and the Russian Orthodox Church (the ROC) is growing. On the contrary, relations with the Roman Catholic Church (the RCC) are growing livelier. Cooperation with main denominations is becoming the main tool of creating “a favorable image of Belarus on the international stage.” Nevertheless, cases regarding freedom of conscience resound in the denomination sphere. Apart from traditional forms of pressure, there are celebrated cases when believers are prosecuted under the criminal code for refusal to take arms and demands of alternative military service.
The long awaited alterations to the law on freedom of conscience were not adopted during the year; meanwhile the For Freedom of Religion initiative has developed an alternative draft law. The attempts to register the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party (the BCD) have been unsuccessful so far, but its relations with Belarusian religious denominations are growing livelier.
Tendencies:
• further pressure on the religious sphere – persecution of certain religious organizations and foreign citizens;
• the regime’s policy aimed at closer relations with the Vatican is dominating the social sphere, but the president is not making any real concessions; • relations with the Belarusian Orthodox Church and its leaders in Moscow
are cooling;
• the BCD is negotiating with religious denominations, especially with the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, but it is most influential among protestants, which determines the specific character of the political discourse.
General information
The most significant events of 2009 were the election of the new Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church and his visit to Belarus and President Lukashenko’s meeting with the Pope in the Vatican.
These events were fully covered in the media, but being extraordinary ones, they cannot give the picture of the whole routine and fundamental tendencies in the sphere of religion.
The 2009 census traditionally included no questions about religious affiliation, which is why there is no possibility to verify the official data on the number of believers of this or that particular denomination. Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Leonid Gulyako noted that under paragraph 5 of the law of the Republic of Belarus on freedom of conscience and religious organizations, “nobody has to give information about their attitude to religion and cannot be forced to express his attitude to religion, to practice religion, or to take or not to take part in activities of religious organizations”1.
Although the same provision referring to national identity is stipulated in the law on national minorities in the Republic of Belarus2, the census questionnaire contained a question about nationality. Having no supportive data, the functionary nevertheless claims that 85% of believers call themselves Orthodox Christian while only 12% call themselves Catholic. L. Gulyako’s opinion is that the “mentality of Belarusians is balanced in this respect.”3
Summing up the results of the ethno-confessional sphere in 2009, L. Gulyako pointed out that in that year no new religious denomination has been registered. As of January 1, 2010 Belarus totals 25 registered religious denominations including 3263 religious organizations, among which “the Belarusian Orthodox Church is considered by many the spiritual leader.”4 It counts 1509 communities, including 36 established in 2009, which is 15% less compared to those in 2008.5
As for the Roman Catholic Church, Gulyako stated that “the role of the ROC in Belarusian social life is growing.”6 As of January 1, 2010 there were 470 communities of this denomination, 3 of them registered in 2009, which is three times less compared to 20087. The tendencies in other denominations were not covered.
The functionary draws the conclusion that in 2009 the state was cooperating with the leading confession more closely with the purpose to strengthen stability in society and secure a positive image of Belarus on the world stage, an image of a country where different religious and ethnical groups co-exist peacefully8. We can infer that “to create a positive image of Belarus on the world stage” is turning into one of the leading strategies of the Belarusian regime, including the sphere of religion; or even predominantly in this sphere.
The main role in this strategy is assigned to the Catholic Church, the relations with which were developing in this very framework: among others we can count such events as Cardinal Tercisio Bertone’s visit to Belarus in 2008; A. Lukashenko’s visit to the Vatican (this was his first official visit after visa sanctions had been lifted, which is highly symbolic); preparation of the concordat; A. Lukashenko’s attempt to organize a meeting between the Moscow Patriarch and the Pope.
But the regime’s actions did not contribute to a positive image. One way or another the confessional sphere was shaken by cases concerning freedom of conscience: Baptists were fined for misuse of buildings (the evangelist Baptists’s Transfiguration church, Vitebsk region); Jehovah’s Witnesses (Mogilev region)9, New Generation (Baranovichi)10, and minister Iryna Marshalkouskaya-Gryk (Chauss district, Mogilev region)11 received a fine for unauthorized religious activities. Two Catholic priests, Edward Smaga and Antoni Bankouski (both Polish citizens), were denied prolongation of visas for religious activities; the case with the building of the New Life Church12 is still developing.
Apart from traditional forms of pressure, there were cases when believers were prosecuted under the criminal code for refusal to take arms and demands of alternative military service: these were the cases of Dmitri Smyk (Jehovah’s Witnesses, Gomel)13 in November and Ivan Mokhailov (Messianic Jews, Minsk)14 in December. We can observe the tendency that over the last years military service has been used as a repressive mechanism.
President Alexander Lukashenko’s repressive religious policies remain unchanged, Forum 18 finds in its survey analysis of freedom of religion or belief in Belarus. The analysts of “Forum 18” note that “legal” restrictions include: requiring all religious activity by groups to have state permission, and be limited to one geographical area; barring meetings for worship or other religious activity in private homes that are either regular or large scale; requiring all places of worship to be state-approved; and routinely expelling both Catholic and Protestant foreign religious workers15. Similar opinion on the religious sphere in Belarus is expressed by the U.S. Department of State in its annual human rights report16 and international religious freedom report17.
European institutions also express their concern for the situation in Belarus: in two resolutions of the European Parliament, in January and in December 2009, freedom of conscience is still considered a hot issue. But the authorities managed to reduce this issue to single instances of persecution and to avert attacks on the key instrument of religious policy, i.e. the law of the Republic of Belarus on freedom of conscience and religious organizations.
Legislation and institutions
In 2008 50,000 signatures were collected to alter or amend Belarusian legislation on religion, because the law adopted in 2002 was regarded as the basis for the repressive state policy; these signatures were also sent to European institutions. In January 2009 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU strategy towards Belarus, which contains a separate paragraph calling on Belarusian authorities “to respect freedom of religion” and condemning the fact that “European citizens, including priests, are being repeatedly expelled from Belarus, which is contrary to the confidence-building process with the EU.”18
Therefore, for European institutions the “facts” of violation of human rights for freedom of religion are the problem, not violation of the law. In December 2009 the European Parliament’s resolution on Belarus, paragraph 15 (9 conditions for the sanctions to be completely lifted and for full re-engagement with Belarus) included the following requirement: “safeguarding freedom of religion for religious denominations other than the Orthodox Church, in particular to let New Life Church operate freely.”19
As we see, European institutions do not regard the law, by which all confessions, Orthodox and non-Orthodox, traditional and non-traditional exist as the root problem. It is the enforcement practice that causes problems. Now they do not draw attention to the law, nor to the norms of the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of January 30, 2008 No 123 that regulates invitation of foreign citizens and stateless persons to the Republic of Belarus for engaging in religious activities, and these are regulatory documents for the religious sphere. Such position of Europe allows the Belarusian regime to solve the issue of one religious organization favorably thus complying with the demands of the European Parliament.
Although the law on freedom of conscience was changed the long-awaited alterations were not adopted. Alterations to the law of the Republic of Belarus on freedom of conscience and religious organizations parts 17 and 18 were insignificant and referred to the procedure of registration of religious communities and associations. The law on alterations to the laws No 109-3 passed the second reading on December 11, 2009 and was signed on January 4, 2010. Meanwhile, the For Freedom of Religion initiative developed an alternative law20, without the preamble of the present version and without some repressive norms hampering religious organizations activities.
On July 8, 2009 the founding meeting of the Civil Council on Morality marked the beginning of the Council’s functioning.21 The initiators of the Council were the Belarusian Orthodox Church and the official Writers’ Union led by Mikhail Charginets. Heads of the Orthodox, Catholic, Lutheran, Jewish and Muslim confessions (i.e. mentioned in the preamble to the law on religions) became members of the Council. It was assumed that the Council would adopt resolutions, recommendations, appeals to broadcasting companies, periodicals, etc. But during 2009 there was not a single case in which the Council took part in or influenced any decision making.
On March 27, Metropolitan Filaret spoke at the meeting of the Synod of the Belarusian Orthodox Church with the president saying that “the Church calls upon the authorities to introduce efficient internet-regulation legislation, similar to that of some countries, for example, China, because this problem is extremely serious.”22 The ordinance No 60 On Enhancement Measures of Usage of the National Segment of the Internet was adopted on February 1, 2010 and will come into force in summer 2010. The state bodies abstained from imitating the “Chinese experience”, but regulations of this sphere promise to be more stringent.
The authorities declined the proposal of the Belarusian Orthodox Church to initiate religious education in schools in any possible form despite that the Church spared no effort. The question of religious education was raised at the meeting of the Synod with the president. The Russian archpriest Andrei Kuraev, author of a course of Orthodox culture for schoolchildren, visited Belarus to promote religious education. The priest accompanied the Russian Patriarch during his visit to Belarus and held a number of meetings with pedagogical staff to prepare the ground for a possible introduction of such course in Belarus. But on October 5 the House of Representatives passed the first read of the Code of Education23, which became the kiss of death for these plans.
Belarusian Orthodox Church: the new Patriarch
The main highlight for the Moscow Patriarchate of 2009 was the assembly of the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church to elect the new Patriarch of Moscow. Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Slutsk, as had been predicted during the previous decade, became one of the candidates to the throne. But being aged and sickly, he decided not to compete and withdrew his candidacy.
On January 27, 2009 Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) was elected Patriarch. Belarus became one of the first countries of the “canonical territory” to which he paid visit. On the eve of the visit the public was considering some topical issues: 1) will the new Patriarch with his reputation for being a “philocatholicist” (“loving Catholics”) approve of the Pope’s visit to Belarus?24 2) will the Belarusian Orthodox Church gain wider autonomy in the Moscow Patriarchate? 3) how will the relations between the Belarusian regime and the Russian Orthodox Church develop? The first year of Kirill’s primacy let us assume possible answers to these questions.
President Lukashenko might have fallen victim of the rumors about Patriarch Kirill’s “pro-Catholic” stance and imagined himself to be in a position to make Belarus the meeting point of the Pope and Patriarch Kirill. He initiated several meetings with the Patriarch. But the Patriarch and the Russian Orthodox Church dealt shortly with the president and gave him to understand that the Moscow Patriarchate requires no mediation25 and can negotiate with the Vatican directly26. Lukashenko’s attempt to become the ROC’s ambassador of peace was decisively repulsed and he had to backtrack27.This was as if old stereotypes broke: the new Patriarch is independent and confident; he asks the president for nothing and gives nothing back. Is that the “new guideline for church-state relations”, of which the Patriarch spoke?
Anyway, it was the first time that the president ignored the Easter mass at the Holy Spirit Cathedral where he had been traditionally awaited. And after just a few days he visited the Vatican. His relations with Patriarch Kirill seem to be falling apart. These discrepancies became even more evident during the Patriarch’s visit to Belarus in September.
Firstly, during his speech at the Palace of the Republic the Patriarch voiced the geopolitical project “Russian world”, an association of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova as an Orthodox civilization based on Orthodox values. The project was presented as an opposite to that of President Lukashenko’s and Belarusian state ideology that would compromise the Pope’s visit and his meeting with the Patriarch in Belarus, so that Belarus would become a bridge between the West and Russia. For the Patriarch Belarus is not a bridge but a part of the “Russian world”.
Secondly, from the stage of the Palace of the Republic, the most official place in Belarus, the Patriarch announced that Kurapaty is one of the symbols of Belarus. Kurapaty is the place feared by the regime, the authorities even ordered to destroy the chapel of the BOC blessed by the deceased Patriarch Alexy II during his visit to Belarus; the Belarusian exarchate suppresses this fact. The Patriarch showed both the Belarusian exarchate and the president what model of church-state relations he appreciates. This model does not include formal declarations of cooperation, the object of pride of the Belarusian Church and the regime, formal ones because the Orthodox religion is not taught at schools, academic degrees are not recognized, the Church receives no real financial help (the allotted funding for certain projects are insignificant even for Belarusian reality).
President Lukashenko ignored not only the Easter mass but the Patriarch’s speech at the Palace of the Republic as well. Even having been decisively repulsed by the ROC the president has no doubt as for the possible meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch28. Although the tone of his statements about his moderation in this process has altered, he still keeps touching upon this issue. To sum up, the new Patriarch’s stance on issues of the Pope’s visit to Belarus and church-state relations is quite definite and clear.
Let us consider the issue of autonomy of the Belarusian Orthodox Church. Firstly, Lukashenko set his meetings with the Patriarch without knowledge of the Belarusian exarchate. Secondly, if we analyze the issues raised by Metropolitan Filaret during the meeting of the Synod with the president (Internet regulation, the Council on Morality, edition of the New Testament of Slutsk, “the moral-spiritual component in Humanities”)29 it convinces us that president managed to buy the exarchate off with the Council on Morality, which has no real power: the Council’s attempt to forbid the concert of Rammstein in Minsk failed; the New Testament of Slutsk was printed in 500 copies.
The authorities accepted the proposal on Internet regulation; probably it was the authorities who induced the Belarusian Orthodox Church to come out with this proposal. As for the main question, Orthodox education at schools, it is still unresolved. Moreover, previous negotiations about introduction of a special subject were reduced to the issue of “the moral-spiritual component in Humanities”30. The issue of PhD theses recognition is also unresolved.
After election of the new Patriarch, relations of the Belarusian Orthodox Church and the centre in Moscow have also changed. Patriarch Kirill’s strategy nullifies speculations about wider autonomy for the BOC. We can even talk about the tendency of narrowing autonomy. The sharp and undiplomatic position of the Patriarch towards President Lukashenko actually nullifies all servile efforts of the BOC to achieve those minor goals that have already been achieved. As a result, relations between the Belarusian regime and the BOC are cooling. On the one side, there are clerics of the BOC, used either to support any proposal from the authorities or keep silent; on the other side, there is the Patriarch with his open and clear position. This Gordian knot, if resoled, may develop into two directions: either the BOC becomes less dependent on the Russian Orthodox Church, if it continues its compromising policy towards the Belarusian regime; or the BOC becomes less dependent on the Belarusian regime, if it chooses solidarity with the political strategy of the ROC.
A possible answer to this question may be found in the pastoral letter of the Synod of the Belarusian Orthodox Church to the Patriarch31. If we compare this letter to a similar one in 2008 issued on the occasion of the late Alexy’s II visit to Belarus, which was greeted with nostalgia for the USSR and rhetoric of the Holy Triune Rus’, the letter to Patriarch Kirill also contained the discourse of the Holy Rus’ and unity, but with less West-Russian rhetoric. On the contrary, the Synod of the BOC mentioned visits of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem, which took place quite a long time ago, and the Patriarch of Antioch visit on the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia, which probably was meant to point out that Belarus belongs to the global Orthodoxy in the first place, and, only in the second place, to the Russian Orthodoxy. The cross of St Euphrosinia of Polatsk was also mentioned as the “sword to protect the state dignity of Belarus”.
Or, we could try to infer the answer from another incident, when the Belarusian Orthodox Church in the person of archimandrite Alexy Shinkevich supported the organizational committee to establish the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party and protested against the Belarusian TV1 that broadcasted a defamatory video report about this movement involving comments of representatives of different denominations. Archimandrite Alexy called the video “sponsored”32, which in Belarusian society where the Belarusian TV1 is the voice of the regime and the opposition, including the BCD, is by definition embodiment of the evil, such statements could be qualified as heroic and even undermining the constitutional order. The video about the BCD was broadcasted together with reports about Patriarch Kirill’s visit and the archimandrite’s reaction followed it immediately. Probably, this brave statement was inspired by the Patriarch’s open speech.
Roman Catholic Church: is the Pope coming?
In 2009 the Roman Catholic Church celebrated the 20th anniversary of its renaissance. September 29, 1989, observance day of Saint Michael the Archangel, is celebrated as renewal of the RCC’s service in Belarus.33 All religious events in 2009 were happening in the context of two questions: firstly, if the “turn” of the Belarusian regime to the Catholic Church will prove fruitful, foremost, if the Pope will accept Lukashenko’s invitation and visit Belarus in the nearest future; secondly, if Belarus and Vatican sign the concordat, an agreement on cooperation.
Already during Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Tercisio Bertone’s visit to Belarus in summer 2008, Lukashenko made an attempt to invite the Pope to Belarus. Mid-April 2009 the president met head of the Catholic Church in Belarus Metropolitan Tadeush Kondrusevich34 and the news that Lukashenko is to visit Vatican broke after less than 2 days.
It is hard to judge if the Belarusian president was welcome in the Vatican, but an audience with the Pope was a symbolic event for Lukashenko. Lukashenko needs the Pope to enlarge his symbolic assets both inside the country and outside it. Two facts should be taken into account: firstly, that it was a private audience, one of many the Pope has during each day. Lukashenko spared no effort to change the audience’s status, but the Vatican’s official press-release was rather bare.35 Secondly, Alexander Lukashenko made another attempt to become a peace maker, and in the name of the Pope announced that the latter meant to meet Patriarch Kirill in the nearest future.36 But this was nothing but bluffing, make believe of improvement of relations with the Roman Catholic Church.
The next step in the development of these relations would be the Pope’s visit to Belarus and signing the concordat. If in 2010 neither the Pope visits Belarus nor the concordat is signed, all the president’s efforts will come to nothing. Even if the media occasionally report about a possible meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch of Moscow, it does not mean that the meeting will take place in Belarus. Leaders of the Roman Catholic Church during their visit ad lumina also passed the Pope an invitation to visit Belarus, but the possibility of such a visit looks bleak, the more so because the process of signing the concordat is losing speed.
As for the concordat itself, after the visit to the Vatican the Belarusian side made loud statements that the document was ready and just about to be signed. Early in June Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Leonid Gulyako said that “Cardinal Tercisio Bertone would visit Belarus before mid-2009 and that during that visit an agreement between the Vatican and Belarus was to be signed.”37 But none of the Vatican’s officials visited Belarus in 2009. Neither the Pope nor even the Vatican’s Secretary of State came to Belarus. The prepared concordat was not signed, either. Only Metropolitan Tadeush Kondrusevich makes occasional remarks that there have been a lot of talks about the concordat, but nothing happens.38 Among all Vatican functionaries, only Walter Kasper, President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity and thus involved in Catholic-Orthodox relations, visited Belarus at the end of the year. This could have furthered the issue of the meeting between the Pope and the Patriarch. But nothing happened.
Nevertheless, we can state that the regime won in its relations with the RCC by promising the Pope’s visit and signing the concordat: despite its connection with Poland and the Polish national issue, the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus maintained neutrality in the conflict with the unregistered Union of Poles in Belarus (led by Andїelika Borys). It is uncertain how long the regime will go on keeping the RCC in this neutrality. The authorities continue persecution of Roman Catholic priests who are Polish citizens and deny visas to Edward Smaga and Antoni Bankouski39.
The Greek Catholic Church
The life of the Belarusian Greek Catholic Church (the BGCC) in 2009 was centered around two issues: to acquire its own church in Minsk (this issue is discussed with the authorities) and to have its own bishop in Belarus (this question is negotiated with the Catholic Church leaders). Though being unprivileged, the Greek Catholic Church is rallying national intelligentsia around itself, who mid-April 2009 sent a petition to the president asking to consider the possibility of building a church on the territory of the former Holy Spirit Church which is currently being reconstructed for the Children’s Philharmonic and pointing out that for 19 years since the renewal of the BGCC its believers have not received permission to build their own church in Minsk. But they received a negative answer40, just after the president had returned from the Vatican.
The Vatican became the addressee of another letter of the Belarusian Greek Catholics. This time it was written by Greek Catholic priests and it concerned the canonical structure of the BGCC41. But the answer has not been received yet.
If both wishes come true: the Greek Catholics have their own bishop appointed (it means they will be a fully canonical church structure) and receive their own church, it might strengthen its positions, at least among the youth and nationally oriented intelligentsia. Within the area of Minsk the Greek Catholic Church could compete with the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches or even become an alternative to them. Celebrating Liturgy in Belarusian and thus uniting national intelligentsia, the BGCC is another danger to the authorities who will hardly allow it to develop.
Alternative Orthodoxy
In the status of a delegate to the Fifth Congress of the Belarusians of the World, Bishop Sviataslau Login, leader of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (the BAOC) visited Minsk, where he, among other activities, consecrated a new priest for the BAOC in Belarus. But further information about the priest’s name or his service is not available. Meanwhile, there is less activity within the Belarusian (People’s) Autocephalous Orthodox Church, namely of the priest Yury Akalovich who had been the “face” of Belarusian opposition for a long time.
The development of Belarusian alternative Orthodoxy could be stimulated by events in Ukraine, particularly the fact that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (led by Metropolitan Methodius Kudriakov) applied to the Patriarchate of Constantinople for membership. The delegation of the Constantinople Patriarchate is to visit Ukraine.42 But it is still too early to speak about Constantinople’s interference into Ukrainian affairs. The Fourth Pan-Orthodox Consultations in Chambesy (Switzerland) allow us to state that relations between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and of Moscow are improving and Ukraine will not become the arena of their confrontation. As for the Constantinople Orthodoxy, there is a Belarusian initiative alternative both to the BAOC and the BOC: the Greek Orthodox movement of Belarus “Belarusians for the Patriarchate of Constantinople”43 led by Bishop Vasil Kastsiuk. But this movement is quite marginal and conflicting, even Kastsiuk’s fellow co-member Reverend Siarzhuk Gorbik left it.44
Belarusian Christian Democracy
As was predicted in the forecast for 2009, this year became year of the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party. There were two founding congresses of the party during the year but it still has not been registered. Two significant events to do with the activities of the BCD in the religious sphere in 2009 should be mentioned. One had to do with the feast in Budslau, where security arrested some BCD activists for distributing the Krynitsa (“A spring”) bulletin. Another was the above mentioned video report about the BCD in the Belarusian TV1 “Panorama”, in which they broadcasted negative references of different religious figures about activities of this party. This program was condemned by a Belarusian Orthodox Church official.
As for the first incident, the BCD activists were intercepted by ordinary Catholic churchgoers who formed the security. This fact impelled Paval Seviarynets to issue an open letter to Metropolitan Tadeush Kondrusevich45. The latter had to express quite a moderate opinion of the BCD activities in his response.46 Nevertheless, the party enjoys very little popularity among Catholics, their percentage in the party is the lowest (about 11– 13%47), although Catholics are traditionally regarded as a more nationally oriented confession in Belarus. A lot of issues of the BCD’s social ethics are similar to those of the RCC. Even that fact that some priests openly support the BCD does not add to the party’s authority among Catholics.
The BCD makes attempts to count Orthodox believers to its supporters, saying that the majority of the party members belong to this denomination. But it is very difficult to evaluate the degree of the BCD’s authority among the Orthodox because there is no open support. We must bear in mind that in September 2009 a significant event, mentioned in the part about the Orthodox Church, happened. Archimandrite Alexy Shinkevich declared that the Belarusian Orthodox Church has nothing to do with the Belarusian TV1 and the official anti-BCD propaganda48. But nevertheless we cannot say that the BOC supports the BCD. The video in the Panorama program was meant to drive off the BCD’s social basis, Christian believers, but the BCD benefited from archimandrite Alexy Shinkevich’s advocacy.
We should note that if the BCD continues regarding this kind of advocacy on the part of the Roman Catholic Church and the Belarusian Orthodox Church as proof that both Churches support it, it could happen that supportive comments on the BCD from the clerics may cease.
Forecast
It is intended that in 2010 the Pope visits Belarus and the concordat with the Roman Catholic Church is signed. These plans will be developed but it is most likely that neither of them will be carried out. They will be point of the greatest public attention and the regime will try to make use of this fact.
As for the Orthodox Church, its relations with the Belarusian regime will remain tense. If Lukashenko does not review his strategy and makes no concessions in different issues, including less attention to the Catholics and introduction of the course of basics of the Orthodox culture in schools, which has already been developed and is lobbied by the Belarusian exarchate together with the Ministry of Education49, then relations may worsen. Moreover, there might be some staff changes in the Belarusian exarchate; it may become less autonomous from Moscow.
During 2010 the BCD will continue its work, first of all with different religious confessions. It might possibly lead to more serious pressure on those associations that will cooperate with this party.
Within the regulatory framework and law enforcement policy there might be more pressure on the part of local bodies of ideological work, the network of which will grow and strengthen on the threshold of the local council elections.
1. http://churchby.info/bel/409/
2. http://www.levonevski.net/pravo/razdel2/num3/2d350.html.
3. Ibid.
4. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2010/01/15-2/
5. http://www.belta.by/ru/print?id=324661.
6. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2010/01/15-2/
7. http://www.belta.by/ru/print?id=324661.
8. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2010/01/15-2/
9. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/10/20-1/
10. http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1327.
11. http://www.prochurch.info/index.php/news/more/15904.
12. http://churchby.info/bel/431/
13. http://www.euramost.org/index.php?artc=13025.
14. http://spring96.org/be/news/32013/
15. http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1311.
16. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136021.htm/
17. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127300.htm.
18. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0027+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language= EN.
19. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2009-0117&language=EN&ring=P7-RC-2009-0248.
20. http://forreligiousfreedom.info/documents/proekt-zakona.htm.
21. http://www.belta.by/ru/belta_news?id=393309.
22. http://churchby.info/bel/288/
23. http://house.gov.by/images/page16/4proekt_kodeksa3sessija2.doc.
24. http://www.svaboda.org/content/transcript/1376030.html.
25. http://news.tut.by/136668.html.
26. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/11/15-2/
27. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/06/27-2/
28. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/11/29-1/
29. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/03/30-1/
30. http://www.president.gov.by/press69021.print.html.
31. http://www.church.by/resource/Dir0301/Dir0302/Page2469.html.
32. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/10/03-1/
33. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/09/29-1/
34. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/04/14-1/
35. http://churchby.info/bel/news/2009/04/27-1/
36. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/04/29-1/
37. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/05/08-1/
38. http://churchby.info/bel/238/
39. http://churchby.info/bel/431/
40. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/06/17-1/
41. http://carkva-gazeta.org/data/63/index.php?id=8-2.php.
42. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/09/30-1/
43. http://belpat.narod.ru.
44. Ibid.
45. http://sieviarynets.net/index.php?newsid=135.
46. http://old.bchd.info/modules.php?name=News&file=view&news_id =3507.
47. The information was voiced at the party convention.
48. http://churchby.info/rus/news/2009/10/03-1/
49. http://www.nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=34744
Vasilevich N. Religious Sphere Development in Belarus: Between the pope and the patriarch. - Belarusian Yearbook 2009. A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 ed. and compl. by Pankovsky A., Kostyugova V. - BISS. - Minsk, 2010. - pp.175-190.
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